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UNITED STATES-SOUTH AFRICAN RELATIONS
TUESDAY, MAY 17, 1966
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMI~E ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITrEE ON AFRICA,
Washin!Jton, D .0.
The subcommittee met at 2 :30 p.m., in room 2200, Rayburn House
Office Building, the Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (acting chairman)
presiding.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order .
Our first witness this afternoon will be Alvin W. Wolfe, repre-
senting Americans for Democratic Action.
STATEMENT OF CURTIS B. GANS, AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC
ACTION
Mr. GANS. My name isCJlrtis Gans and I am appearing for Amer-
icans for DemOcratic Action. I work on their staff. I want to
thank the members of the committee and their chairman for giving
us this opportunity to present our testimony. We are expert wit-
nesses. This is Mr. Wolfe,J, associate professor of anthropology at
Washington University at bt. Louis.
You all have copies of the testimony. Some of his articles on South
Africa and other parts of Africa are listed in the bibliography in
references here.
Mr. Wolfe ~
STATEMENT OF ALVIN W. WOLFE, AME,RICANS FOR D,EMOCRATIC
ACTION
Mr. WOLFE. Mr. Chairman, my name is Alvin W. Wolfe. I am
an associate professor of anthropology at Washington University, St.
Louis, Mo., and I am representing Americans for Democratic Action.
I would like to thank the commIttee for giving me this opportunity
to testify.
Among those who have a feeling of responsibility for the fate of
mankind, and among those whose positions as statesmen of the world
give them some real responsibility for that fate, there is consensus
that the white-supremacy-apartheId system of South Africa ought to
be changed. The present regime in South Africa has boon condemned
again and again in the United Nations, with, we should note, the
delegation from the United States joining in that condemnation.
41\}
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At their 1965 national convention, Americans for Democratic Ac-
tion included the following two paragraphs in the resolutions rele-
vanttoAfrica:
* * * In regard to the situation in the Republic of South Africa, we agree
wholeheartedly with our Government's condemnation in the United Nations
of apartheid. But, we are deeply troubled that this condemnation is belied by
the Govermnent's permitting American financial and industrial interests to
bolster by trade and investment the South African economy which in turn
ruthlessly exploits the nonwhite majority.
Because continuation of the apartheid system can only lead to more violence
and bloodshed, ADA urges the United States to join with other states in adopt-
ing full economic sanctions against South Africa until apartheid is abandoned.
We urge full sanctions, rather than selective boycott or embargo, because the
purpose is not to destroy but to save the South African economy, and the period
of actual imposition will be reduced, perhaps even eliminated, if the threat is
universal and complete.
The U.S. Government has not adopted the strategy of applying real
pressure on the white South Africans to bring them to reckon with
the demands of a world which no longer will tolerate such racist ex-
ploitation as they practice. Instead, our Gov~rnment merely laments
the inequities in that system and implies a hope that these will pass
a way as South African society experiences economic growth.
It may be that in selecting among alter~ative strategies aimed at
changing the South African system, American policymakers have
attempted to assess the relative gains and losses of each strategy. I
am convinced that they have settled on the wrong strategy, and I
should like to present some relevant evidence: first, some arguments
demonstrating that the South African regime will not soften, sweeten,
or go away as a natural consequence of further economic develop-
ment; second, some arguments in favor of the feasibility of effective
pressure in the form of international economic sanctions.
THE FALLACY THAT INDUSTRIALIZATION ITSELF MAY END RACIST
EXPLOITATION
Most social scientists who have analyzed the South African situa-
tion conclude that the system is moving toward some sort of violent
upheaval, implying that the time is past when amelioration might
have precluded revolution. Still, American businessmen and Govern-
ment spokesmen give the impression that the racist exploitation on
which the whole structure is based will gradually disappear as South
Africa becomes more industrialized. Is that what happened to slav-
ery in America ? Or to racial discrimination in AmerIca ? Hardly.
What progress has been made in the United States has been the result
of polItical action, usually with the force of the Federal Government
applied against the exploiters. If the U.S. Government had banned,
prohibited, imprisoned, or executed all those who worked for eco-
nomic and civil rights, the situation here would be more comparable
to that in South Africa. There simply is no evidence that industriali-
zation produces freedom. Only men with courage enough and men
with freedom enough to work for freedom can establish a climate of
freedom in a country.
In South Africa, all the indicators point in the opposite direction,
with a steady erosion of freedom since 1948 when the N ationalists
took over the Government. Each outcry against this erosion, by white
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or black, is met by harsher restrictions. The infamous practice of
90-day detention without trial was withdrawn in 1965 only to be re-
placed by an even harsher practice, the detention for 180 days of so-
called state witnesses held anonymously and incommunicado. What
observer of South Africa could honestly hold that those in control of
such a vicious regime will, because they are "civilized" people "just
like us," relax their totalitarian system and move toward freedom
as they industrialize ~
During this period since 1948, the economy has grown enormously,
at something like 7 pffi'cent per year. Yet, no amelioratioI). in the
African condition attends thIS rapid industrialization. The largest
se~ent of the African "'!'Ior!r force is in agri~ul!ure, and growth in
thI5: industry by mecharnzahon can only be detrllllental to the~11 un-
skilled workers who do not, of course, own the land ( 87 percent of the
land is reserved for whites by law).
In mining, the African workers aJi'e at the bottom with an average
wage of $213 annually, an incredibly Jow rate that the mining in-
dustry can maintain only because of their monopolistic organization.
Through the Chamber of Mines and with Goverll:lllent aid, the industry
recruits workers from neighboring territories under colonial rule to
keep a work force available even though the labor turnover reaches
close to 100 percent per annum. In manufacturing, where wage rates
are slightly higher than they are in mining, the growth is not
ameliorating African conditions generally, for Africans occupy the
unskilled jobs, the very jobs that are lost as industry becomes more
capital intensive. The slightly higher wage rates in manufacturing
should not be exaggerated: the African in manufacturing receives an
annuaL average wage of $590, where it has been estimated that $800
anI).l1ally is the necessary minimum cost of living for the African in
the city. ( Source: "Labor in South Africa," study prepared by the
American Committee on Africa, New York, 1965.) TheGovernment
decrees that only workers whose earnings exceed $764 per year are
eligible for unemployment insurance benefits, making the vast ma-
jority of Africans ineligible for unemployment compensation. Fur-
ther, the Government helps to keep Africans restricted to low-paying
jobs in industry directly by enforcing job reservations designed to
protect white workers, and indirectly by restricting Africans to pri-
mary education in Bantu languages only. Africans have long been
denied the right of coJlective bargaining, and in 1953 the Native Labor
Act explicitly forbade strikes and lockouts by African workers.
The process of industrialization itself could hardly induce ameliora-
tive change when the power is all in the hands of the whites who; al-
together, white farmer, white worker, and white industrialist, profit
from the exploitation of the Africans.
PRESSURE ON SOUTH AFRICA THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
The economic boom in South Africa is the creation of political
forces, within South Africa and QutsideSouth Africa. It results from
the increasing need of the industrial world for the kinds of minerals
South African-based companies produce and it results from the dis-
covery by American, British, and German investors that they can
62-287-66-pt. 3-3
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use this "plant" where profits are high because a ruthless government
not only permits but fosters the exploitation of workers. This is a
political matter. The play of market forces is already so much re-
stricted that the classical "invisible hand" is paralyzed. Ridding the
world of apartheid is bound to have economic consequences, but the
converse is also true, that economic pressure applied from outside can
rid the world of apartheid. The longer the world delays the applica-
tion of economic sanctions, the more difficult will be the task, not so
much because South Africa's economic growth enhances its self-
sufficiency as because South Africa's economic growth provides that
Government with more and more means to further repress the vast
majority of its population. The Government's expenditures for ~lice
and defense-defense against Africans-have. been increased fan-
tastically in the last 3 years. In 1966 South AfrIca has "reached a new
milestone" with the manufacture of its own military jets.
To 8Ippreciate the feasiibility of economic sanctions it is important
to underline the vulneraibility of the political-economic situation :
heavy-handed Government control over land and labor together with
Government 8,$Urallces of freedom to take profits out of the country
provides a picture attractive to the foreign investor. He can, it would
seem, have his cake and eat it too. Any reduction in those profits, or
any application of Government controls on foreign investments would
stimulate disinvestment. And the Government needs that investment
( for example, the $650 million in American investment, increased
from $300 million in 1961) in order to have the strength to practice its
policy of total domination of its African subjects. The potential con-
sequences of a cut in the foreign trade of South Africa are so enormous
because of this peculiarly unstable political-economic situation.
Although South Africa is classified as "developed" and other Afri-
can COuntriM as "developing," it does not £ollow that their patterns are
complementary. Though more industrial than other African ter-
ritories, South A£rica still exports largely primary products. These
account £or more than 80 percent of its exports, and they go not to
African countries, but to the United Kingdom, the Urnted States,
West Germany, and Japan.
Amon~ African territories only those immediately adjacent to
South Africa would feel the effects of internationally applied eco-
nomic sanction against South Africa: the economies of Basutoland,
Bechuanaland, and Swaziland are now firmly tied in with that of
South Africa; Rhodesia gets 25 percent 0£ its imports £rom South
Africa, but sells less than 10 percent of its exports there ; 12 percent of
the imports of Mozambique ~me from South Africa, and 10 percent
of its exports ~o there. N either Zambia nor Congo would suffer
hardship if the South African trade were cut off completely. Their
present imports £rom South Africa could be replaced with imports
from other countries, and most of their exports to South Africa, such
as copper and diamonds, are ultimately destined for other markets
jn any event. For example, in 1961 Congo exported to South Africa
$26 million in djamonds which were then exported by South Africa,
in fact, represented 72 percent of South Africa's diamond exports.
However many Afrjcans in independent states might like to apply
pressure on South Africa to change its political pattern, their eco-
nomic Dressure would be and has been inadequate to the task. Effective
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international sanctions require the participation of the so-called
developed areas of the world, which provide 81 percent of South
Africa's imports and take 69 percent of her exports. In fact, the
real responsibilty for making sanctions work lies with three major
trading countries : the United Kingdom, the United States, and the
Federal Republic of Germany. These three powers provide over
half. of S~uth Africa's. imp<?rts and together buy. half her exports. .
VIs-a-Vls these tradrng gIants, the South AfrIcan economy, despIte
the high profits it affords some major investors, appears miniscule.
Whereas the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany ac-
count for 1 percent of the total. And whereas the trade of these three
countries is crucial to South Africa, their South African trade is
but a tiny proportion 01 their own total trade: in 1963, slightly over
3 perceI;lt for the United Kingdom, and slightly. over 1 I?ercent for
the U mted Sta~es ~nd Germany. .( Source: U mted N ahons Year.
book of InternatIonal Trade StatIstIcs, 1963. )
A complete cessation of trade with South Africa, even if it were
not balanced by replacement in other countries, would mean virtuaJly
no general economIc cutback for the major industrial economies which
are the major traderS with South Africa; a recent analysis by
G. D. N. Worswick concludes for the United Kingdom, where 3 percent
of external trade is with South Africa, that the economic consequences
of sanctions would be "imperceptible," under the optimal policy ac~
cording to which sanctions were effectively applied to South Africa in
a combrned operation of all the nations. Worswick predicts that even
under the worst possible circu~stances, "if B~itain acted unilaterally,
and then proceeded to cope wIth consequentIal balance-of-payments
problems by the wrong means, the outcome might mean a sacrifice 0£
2% percent of national product." ( Segal 1964: 185. ) Since the
United Kingdom, with the United States, would be among the last
states to agree to apply sanctions against South Africa, we may safely
disregard this last case ( the worst possible circumstances wherein
Britain acts unilaterally) and we may also safely assume that if
there is concerted action by these major states sanctions will be effective.
Thus, the "optimal policy" prediction is the relevant one: the impact
on the British economy of effective sanctions against South Africa
would be imperceptible.
Mr. RosENTHAL. If I might ask a question at this point, what would
happen to the British investment in South Africa ?
Mr. WOLFE. During the period of sanctions that investment would
not be producing income I presume.
Mr. RosENTHAL. Would you think in the long run that investment
would be lost to the United Kingdom ?
Mr. WOLFE. No, I should not think so because I would expect com-
plete economic sanctions to be effective in changing the Government
of South Africa. The result, Ithen, in, I would expect, a short time
would be a government which would recognize that those investments
continue to be held by whoever held them ~reviously.
Mr. RosENTHAL. If exactly the OpposIte were the case ? In other
words, if sanctions did not bri,ng down that Government ?
Mr. WOLFE. If sanctions did not bri,ng down the Government
and-
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United Kingdom, with the United States, would be among the last
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disregard this last case (the worst possible circumstances wherein
Britain acts unilaterally) and we may also safely assume that if
there is concerted action by these major states sanctions will be effective.
Thus, the "optimal policy" prediction is the relevant one: the impact
on the British economy of effective sanctions against South Africa
would be imperceptible.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. If I might ask a question at this point, what would
happen to the British investment in South Africa ~
Mr. WOLFE. During the period of sanctions that investment would
not be producing income I presume.
Mr. RoSENTHAL. Would you think in the long run that investment
would be lost to the United Kingdom ~
Mr. WOLFE. No, I should not think so because I would expect com-
plete economic sanctions to be effective in changing the Government
of South Africa. The result, then, in, I would expect, a short time
would be a government which would recognize that those investments
continue to be held by whoever held them ~reviously.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. If exactly the opposIte were the case ~ In other
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Mr. WOLFE. If sanctions did not bring down the Government
and-
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Mr. ROSENTHAL. Inother\vords, the point that you make if:) t4~t th~
United Kingdom would lose 2¥2 percent 0£ th.eir national prod1,lct, ¥1/~
percent if they did not de-al with South AfrIca !:!-ny longer. I thlIik
what is in the baek always casting a shadow over that is the enormous
inve$~J;lt they have, $3. bil~iQn or more than that. They are very
much coRcerned about the lllv~stment.
You assume that sanctions would bring down the, Government and in
short order the investment would be returned or sa£e. I belie-ve the
people over there have some doubt abo1,lt that. ..
Mr. WOLFE. I am sure, that I understand the questIon. I Just can't
believe that complete economic sanctions appl~ed mtern~tionaUy WQUld
not be effective. I think what mig4t happen w9uld b~ a rev{)lutiQl),::1:ry
situa;tion in which a g-overnme!lt hos~ile to foreign invest~ent m~ght
possIbly take over. I ~()n't thmk thIS would be the case I£ sapctlons
were appliedquiekly .This will be more likely the longer we delay.
That is what I meant at the beginninfJ; of my statement when J sal~
that the longer we delay the more difficult will be the application of
sanctions.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. In view 0£ the time problem and in view of the
rather lengthy bnt certainly well prepared statement- I h~ ve reviewe-d
it already~I wonder if you would have any objecti~to including the
entire statement in the record, and proceeding to qu~t~Q];ling so that
we might hit solne of your important points.
M r .WOLFE. No, sir; I have no objeetion.
(The unread portion 0£ Mr. Wolfe's statement follows: )
With reference to the American economy, Elliot Zupnick recently analyzed
the disemployment effects of a total cessation of U.S. exports to South Africa.
Using deliberately extreme estimates of disemploy~ent factors for different in-
dustries. he arrives at the conclusion that sanctions would result in 51,546 un-
employed workers. Segal 1964 : 190) That is, as he says, "a very minor im-
pact"-.,,'-especially jf one thinks at all about the 15,000,000 and more Africans who
arethe ultima'te beneficiaries of the sanctions policy. Suppose the question
wer~put thu~ : sball15,000.000 Africans continue in complete subjection in South
Africa ~n order to preserve 51,546 American jobs ?
It should be stated. however, that Zupnick's analysis overstates the potential
damage to the American economy by cutting off all exports to South Africa.
Z~pnici!= !leems, not to have taken into account the considerable replacement of
imports and exports around the world th~t would mitigate such effects as dis-
employment. Some commodities purchased now from South Africa by other coun-
tries would then be sought from the United States. The United Kingdom imports
many foods froroSouth Africa, foods which the United States could easily furnish.
South Africa now exports manufactured goods, half of which is purchased by
developing countries. American producers, as well as Europeans, would be in a
position to meet the external demand that South Africa now fills for $43,000 worth
of chemicals ( SITC 5) , $256,000,000 in "manufactured goods ( SITC 6) ,
$48.~,(;j(}O in maehinery, transport and equipment (SITC 7), and $25,000.000 in
"miscellaneous manufactured goods" ( SITC 8) .( UN Doc. A/ AC. l15/L.55,
1964) The increased American e~rts implied in such relocations would offset
much ()f the disemployment of which ~upnick speaks.
More important than general disemployment effects might be the effects of
losS$ ot' p,-rtic\1mr cQmmodities th~t are now imported from South Africa. For
the United States, Zupnick states, "To the best of my knowledge am.Qsite asbestos
is the only commodity ~urrently imported from South Africa which would fall
into. this category ( of g000g for which t1Jere are no adequate substitutes) ."
(S~gal,1004 :191~2r
Amosite asbestos is apparently necessliryto"some aspect of the deJ;ense industry,
and is listed ~sa strategic mineral. ffDwever, the United StaWs does have a
stockpile, 32,000 short tons in 1962 (Segal, p.191) which grew to 87;944 as of July
31. 1963 ( Congressional Record, vol. 109, pp. 21684-21689) .Since that stockpile
is some five times greater than the amount impOrted annually. which is in turn
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obviously greater than the amount used, it is clear that the defense industry could
get along for several years without additional imports. Certainly, the complete
isolation of South Africa by intei'tlational sanctions would not last that long.
Alternatively, other sources of amosite asbestos may be developed in the interim,
or substItute products may be developed.
Another defeIise-related mineral which the Vnited States imports from South
Africa is uranium. While uranium imports from South Africa are a high propor-
tion of all American uranium imports, this is neither indicative of a world short-
age of uranium nor of South Africa's efficiency in producing uranium. Actually,
the United States has more uranium of all types than it can use in the near
future, and has reduced imports from all countries eiJ}cept South Africa, and has
even cut back purchases from domestic producers. Not only is the U.S. purchasing
uranium it does not need from South Africa, but it is paying the South African
producers (mainly gold-mining subsidiaries 0( Anglo-American Corporation of
South Africa, DeBeers Consolidated Mines, and Consolida'ted Gold Fields, Ltd.)
a much higher price for its uranium than is necessary. In 1958, the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy of the U.S. Congress was unable to learn from A.E.C. repre-
sentatives the price the A.E.C. was paying for U):IWlium from South Africa, the
A.E.C. claiming that secrecy was maintained at the request of the South Africans,
llOt the United States. (Hearings before the Joint CommIttee on Atomic En-
ergy, EJighty-fifth Congress of the United States, 1958, pp. W--21 and passim.)
A normally reliable newsletter, Africa, 1964, re~ted that the United Kingdom-
United States Combined Atomic Developmen't Authority is paying $1~ per pound,
while American producers would be willing to sell at $4 (Africa, 1964, No.5,
March, 196!). As early as 1961, before full uranium production was achieved
by all the asS()Ciated gold-mining companies, South Africa's annual exports of
uranium amounted to $l11,OOO,000. By 196!, when full production was reached,
the figure must have elevated. Sanctions against South Africa, then, would npt
cause proble~ for the uranium industry generally, ex~pt those producers who
made the unusually profitable arrangement with the A.E.C. (and financed,
incidentJally, by the American Export- Import Bank) , an arrangement which
supposedly holds through 1966.
Another important category of mineral exports from South Africa is that of
nonferrous ores and concentrates (SITC Division ~), which amounted in 1961
to $53,000,000 of which the United States purchased 42 per cent and the United
Kingdom, 13 per cent. (UN Document A/Ac.l15/L. 55,196!). Clearly, this cate-
gory is important to the South African economy, but it turns out to be a negligible
amount, easily replaceable, for these two receiving countries. The American
share, 42 per cent of South African exports, is a mere 5.6 per cent of American
imports of ,this category : and the 13 per cent of South African exports which go
to the United Kingdom is only 3.7 per cent of British imports of non"ferrous ~res
and concentrates (SITC Division 288). More detailed analysis would probably
reveal that much of the volume in this category actually derives from territories
that are not legally a Part of the Republic of South Africa. From the South-West
African mines of the Tsumeb Corporation and from the mines of the South-West
Africa Company come important ores such as copper, lead, zinc, and tin, listed
as South African exports although there is little or none actually produced in the
Republic. South-West Africa is reported to have exported $87,068,317 worth of
minerals in 1963, $57,395,467 in diamonds and $14,590,436 in "lead complex con-
centrates." (UN Document A/AC. 109/1.154.) It would be ideal, of course, if
South-West Africa could be liberated from South African rule before sanctions:
are imposed; but failing that, even the inclusion of South-West Africa under the.
boycott would not produce a world shortage of those minerais, most of which are-
produced in even greater quantity in other African territories now independenL
With so much concern being expressed about the general problem of the suffi-
ciency of gold reserves for regulattng international trade balances, the publiC"
may well be led to believe that the gold coming out of South Africa is necessary
for the whole world economy. Most economists sophisticated in these matters:
feel that our general reliance, by international agreement, on gold as the ultimate
"balancer" of accounts is unwise. Now that international trade has grown s~
enormously, there simply is not enough gold for such purposes in the2Oth century..
It is clear to most that continued expansion in world trade will necessitate the'
institutionalization of new mechanisms, such as the International Monetary Fun<I
wa~ at it~ inception, ,vhich reduce or eliminate entirely the reliance on gold for
such ad.iustments.
Roger Opie has written :
"If cutting off the supplies of South African gold were to precipitllte an inter-
national liquidity crisis-as, in any case, it would bring any such crisis that much
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nearer-there is no lack of proposals for dealing with one--proposals in the names
of Triflin, Berns'tein, Stamp, Maudling, and Zolotas." (Segal, 1964: 162.)
We can do no better here than to quote Opie's conclusion: "that such a ban on
the purchases of South African gold could severely damage the South African
economy; that such a ban need do no more than the most trifling damage to the
international monetary system (and might just precipitate a much needed series
of reforms therein) ; tbat eQuallY, the damage to the United Kingdom would be
small, although the damage to a very small number of City firms could be serious."
Segal, 1964 : 166. )
THE POSITIoN OF PRIVATE FmMs IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE
The statement just quoted, that the damage to a nation would be small although
the damage to a small number of firms might be serious, directs our attention to
a special dimension of the problem of economic sanctions. Though South African
trade with the United Sta~ accounts for the tiniest fraction of total American
foreign trade, there are particular companies heavily involved. Although trade
statistics of the kind we have been considering are presented as if "countries"
were the social units making transactions, the fact is that this trade is virtually
all between private companies here and private companies there. Any restrictions
on trade will be restrictions on profit-making private enterprises. One must,
therefore, expect the most effective opposition to sanctions against South Africa
to come from the many companies active in various enterprises, es~ially mining,
in South Africa. Making enormous profits in the system as it is, they cannot,
alas, be expected to support an action designed to reduce those profits. Ulti-
mately, they might be convinced that it is in their interest ,to forgo high profits
now in return for a more stable long-term development in a freer political en-
vironment. However, they will avoid facing these facts as long as they are per-
mItted to do so.
They will argue against sanctions-in favor of time. Clarence Randall, an
American spokesman of internationally-oriented business, has several years ago
argued that we should not push the South Africans. "At heart they are our kind
of folk. In the end they will do right. Let us give them a little more time."
(Randall, 1963, p. 80.) Secretary Williams' statement before the Subcommittee
on Africa reflects the influence from this quarter on our South African policy.
They will argue against sanctions--appealing to that elusive principle of sepa-
ration of business and government. Yet, as we have already remarked, they are
involved in a political situation-which is currently profitable to them. Else-
where in several papers, I have discussed the close relationship between busi-
nesses and governments in the mining industry of southern Africa. (Wolfe,1962,
1963, 1966.) Union Miniere in Congo, even while financing Katanga's secession,
claimed to avoid IKIlitical entanglement. The British South Africa Company, con-
sidering itself above politics, still sought from the British Government as late
as 1962 a guarantee that constitutional developments in Northern Rhodesia
(Zambia) would not jeopardize its mineral rights seized by political action a
generation ago. There was certainly heavy involvement in politics when the
South African gold-mining companies, subsidiaries of American-related firms
such as Anglo-American and Consolidated Gold Fields, worked out a riskless profit
venture with the A.E.C., including a generous $100 million loan from the American
Government-owned Export-Import Bank. They will still argue, however, as
Harry Oppenheimer has repeatedly, that they interfere politically as little as
possible. This means, I think we must understand, that they try to avoid respon-
sibility for political actions, though they influence events to their own profit
where they can. Thus, C. W. Engelhard, director of Anglo-Arilerican and a
generally large investor in South Africa, was appointed by President Johnson to
represent the United States at Zambia Independence Day ceremonies. These
"private" businessmen do have political influence, and they will oppose the use of
sanctions. (Mr. Engelhard, by the way, also sits on the Board of South Africa's
Chamber of Mines, 'a quasi-governmental body which sets employment and other
standards for the industry. )
The role of these comINl.nies must be undergtood, for it is crucial to the feasi-
bility of sanctions. The majority of the atrected companies are sufficiently large.
sufficiently diversified in their operations, sufficiently dilspersed territorially, and
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sufficiently organized for cooperation with each o~er, to adapt to ~e ~ec~ssity of
restricting ~eir South African operations for a time wi~out complete collapse.
Thlis is obviously true for ~e purely fimlncial enterprises such as Chase Man-
hattan, and for the essentially manufacturing firms such as General Motors or
the Underwood Corporation. It is also true--though less obviQus--for the mining
firms. American Metal Climas is one American company whose profits would be
affected by a prohibition of trade with South Africa-but the effects wOltlld not
be disastrous. If they could not benefit from sales 0It copper by the South African
firms O'okiep and Palabora, they could rncrease copper productioo from their
Roman Selection Trust mrnes ill Zambia. Even if their valuable Tsumeb prop-
erty ill South-West Africa were also cut off, some of the loss would be recovered
by speedrng up operations elsewhere ill the world-rn Mexico, in Canada, ill the
United States. Phelps Dodge C'orporation and Newmont Mrnrng Corporation,
related American corporations with similar rnvestments ill South Africa equally
have considerable freedom to adjust their investments to minimize lo~ in the
event of an economic boycott of South Africa.
Even companies with their major roots in South Africa have hedges outside.
Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa has important operations ill Zambia,
rncluding Rhokana Corporation (copper) and Rhodesia Broken Hill (lead, zrnc,
cadmium) , and ill Tanganyika where it has Williamson Diamond, Ltd. The
diamond industry, controlled by a system of associated companies, rncludrng
DeBeers C()llsolidated Mrnes, could still flourish, and profit, outside of South
Africa. while sanctions were ill effect. Pr~ure from African states alone has
already required some reorganization of the Diamond Producers Association's
network for purchasing diamonds, so thnt they do not go through S<mth African
hands. Of this reorganization, South African H. F. Oppenheimer, C:hairman
of DeBeers, said ill 1964 : "These changes will not disrupt the centralized mar-
ketrng organization ill London, which is essential ill the interests of all diamond-
producrng countries, whatever the I:JQlitical difference between them may be."
( UN Document AI AC.109/L.154, 1964, p. 33. )
Consolidated Gold Fields Limited, despite its name and heavy rnvestment ill
actual gold mining operations ill South Africa, would not fall d~titute under
pemlty of sanctions, for its widespread rnvestments outside, includrng even a
61 pe~cent rnterest ill American Zinc Lead and! Smelting Company, provide a
cushion agarnst the collapse of the South African economy.
The foregorng are but a few examples to illustrate that the major trade that
would be affected by sanctions is not carried on by small family firms which
have no way <mt. Further, most of these firms are so rntrica.tely rnterconnected
ill what I have elsewhere called la supranational social system that the burden
of losses ill South Africa woUld be almost automatically shared among them, even
as are the high profits of today. (Wolfe,1963.)
Not only would it be, therefore, unnecessary for the governments which im-
posed sanctions to attempt to devise means of compensating private companies
for losses sustained, but it would be unwise to do so. The major pressure on
white South Africans to cOOnge their political system must certainly CO'Il;le from
these private cOmpanies; and only if they will actually suffer loss of profits will
they effectively apply such pressure.
This situation is truly the key to the puzzling question of the feasibility of
sanctions. The major companies must be made uncomfortable enough quickly
enough that they use their rnfluence to change the South African system,
OONCLUBION
Such consideration of the patterns of international trade as we have been
able to present in, this brief paper lead Us to conclude that internationally
organiZed economic isolation is a possible means of effecting political change
in South Africa. It may. indeed. be the only meams that can remove the
apartheid system without precipitating major violence. This is a means which
requires a minimum expression of military threat. and would leaSt arouse cold
war passions.
We have seen that South Africa is vulnerable to this approach. Its Govern-
ment depends oil and participates in the growing economy which is heavily
dependent on external trade and investment. Economic isolation would harm
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South Africa but the international consequences would be so distributed as to be
minimally harmful to other states. The American economy as a whole would
be virtually unaffected. The lo~s to some few major British and American
"international" corporations, far from providing a l'eagQn not to impose sanctions,
may be precisely the stimulation necessary to force these companies which have
long been profiting from apartheid to use their influence in South Africa to bring
about political change. Their dffiire to stay out of "politjcs" may be genuine--it
may even be a noble principle to espouse. But, the fact is, they are already in
politics and must in this case be maneuvered into a position where they have to
do what is right. Nonviolent pressure from the people of all nations can be
applied internally in South Africa only through the intermediariffi of the majo,r
companiffi involved in the trade of many nations. Their financial losses will be
small beside the losses to the people of those many nations if the issue must be
settled by guns.
One last point should be made. It is conceivable that the actual application of
sanctions might be unnecessary. The threat alone, if unambiguous, would start
a process of disinvestment and general physical withdrawal that might be suffi-
cient to bring on the kinds of pressures sought. We can envisage the adjustments
that would commence as soon as the world's busin~men knew that on a specific
date in the future, all trade with South Africa would cease. The rush would be
to get out, not in, with all possible money, capital equipment, and goods. The
reaction of the South African Government would be to restrict such movement,
and the prffiSUre of the financial world would inevitably fall hard upon that
Government to give up, to comply with the will of mankind.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. One of the arguments that we have heard fre-
quently is that by looking a~ the prob~em of. apartheid an.d thinking
about how we can deal wIth It, we are InvolvIng ourselves Improperly
in the internal affairs of another nation. How would you respond
to that ?
Mr. WOLFE. It certainly would be involving ourselves in the in-
terual affairs of another nation. If this were done by the United
Nations under the proper paragr11ph of the United Nations Charter
or some convention I am sure it would be no worse an intervention
than we seem to be engaging in elsewhere.
Even now, it seems to me we are now intervening politically by
permitting the investment and the real exploitation of the Africans
by the whi~.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. There are two or three things. We might be able
to do something about advising American businessmen that it is con-
trary to American principles to continu~ their investment.
United Nations action requires the invocation of chapter 7. This,
in turn, requires a determination that there is a threat to international
peace: Do you ~eel there is ~uch a threat to international peace and
securIty warrantIng U .N .actIon ?
Mr. WOLFE. I do not know enough of the legal arg-uments on that
particular question to really give a good answer. I would answer
"Yes," but I am afraid it would be more an emotional response than
one based upon international law.
Mr. RoSJ!JNTHAL. One of the arguments Nielsen gives in his book-
I do not remember the name of it-against sanctions is that sanctions
are cumulative with each step leading to a successive step. In other
words, if you invoke limited sanctions and they do not work directly
you have to follow them up with a blockade. If a blockade does not
work, you follow it up with some kind of military action. Assuming
that from the very beginnint!; you are going to wind up in the final
step of military action, is this what you are recommending ?
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Mr. WOLFE. I think that complete economic sanctions would, as I
suggest here, less likely lead to real military action on the ground
than any other step we could take now.
Mr. RosENTHAL. When you say complete economic sanctions, sup-
posing a state did not go along with it, any nation, and they sent
!heir ships in. Wo~ld you sugge,st tha! we have a block3;de and phys-
Ically stop those shIps from d~almg, wIth the South AfrIcans ~
Mr. WOLFE. Yes, sir; I think complete economic sanctions would
imply a blockade of the ports, if that were necessary. I presume
there would be ships under United Nations authority checking on
such transportation.
Mr. RoyBAL. Would the gentleman yield ~Mr. RosENTHAL. Yes. .
Mr. RoYBAL. Do you mean by economic sanctions the United King-
dom and United States and Republic of Germany ohly ~
Mr. WOLFE. No; no.
Mr. RoYBAL. Will you explain ~
Mr. WOLFE. Yes. I would think it would be international economic
sanctions under the authority of the United Nations with all of the
nations bound by this.
Mr. RoYBAL. What I do not understand is what legal reason would
,ve have through the United Nations to effectuate the proposal that
you have made.
Mr. WOLFE. I more or less decline to answer that question on the
ground that I don't know all the intricacies of international law. I
,vould think something like this might be done. Right now there are
economic sanctions or at least certain sanctions on certain products
applied against Southern Rhodesia. South Africa is permitting oil
to go through to Southern Rhodesia. This might be adequate means,
reason to enlarge the application of sanctions against Rhodesia t9 in-
clude all of southern AfrIca.
I do not think the Rhodesian sitqation can ever be settled finally
until the South African situation is settled also. Even though the
present South African Government-'-
Mr. RosENTHAL. You do not suggest that the Rhodesian situation is
going to have ,to wait until the final settlement of South Africa before
that IS straightened out, do you ~
Mr. WOLFE. I do not think that there will be a settlement of the
Rhodesian question satisfactory to the African states, independent
African states, and the Africans living in Rhodesia, until the South
African regime is changed as well.
Mr. RosENTHAL. Mr. Broomfield ~
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The thing that is
confusing to me is this timetable. For the life of me, I just cannot
understand, with the problems that we have got in the world today,
jncl~ding Vietnam, why we are now trying to stjr up trouble in South
AfrIca.
Certainl;v, I don't go along with what is going on in South Africa
but r am Just reluctant to get in and try to tell the South Africans
how to run their internal affairs.
I certajnly do not like the racial policjes they have thefebut it seems
to me that we have got enough problems throughout the ,vorld with-
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OJ.lt rying to create more of them. Probably yOJ.l do not want to even
comment aboJ.lt it.
I do not have any qJ.lestions.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Roybal ?
Mr. WOLFE. Could I comment on th~ Congressman's statement?
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think you should.
Mr. WOLFE. I c~rtainly appreciate his concern about getting into
more trouble somewhere else and r would never recommend that my
country should engage in such a serious matter as economic sanctions
against another country if I did not think that they were the best
means to avoid more serious trouble later. This is the reason I would
foster it.
I think the situation in SoJ.lth Africa, as I said in the beginning of
my statement, is deteriorating in every respect and I-
Mr. BROOMFIELi>. What do you mean, "in every respect" ? Business-
wise are they not doing better over there ? Are we not doing more
business with South Africa ?
American investments are going up all the time.
Mr. WOLFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Are they not doing the best of any country in
Africa ?
Mr. WOLFE. In terms of profit-
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Everything.
Mr. WOLFE ( continJ.ling) .And economic growth measured by gross
national product. What I meant by deteriorating in every resp~ct is
every political reSpect, in respect to the relations between the whites
and the Africans, relations between the Gov~rnment and the people
who are governed regardless of color, because' I think the situation for
the whites, for the liberal whites, is deteriorating in South Africa
as well.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. What is the average wage of the Africans in South
Africa in comparison with some of the other countries of Africa ? Do
you have any idea what ,the annual wage of these men is ~
Mr. WOLFE. Yes. The annJ.lal wage figured in dollars for South
African Africans is higher, as the South Africans advertise constantly,
than the average income of Africans in most other African states.
But there is also another thing which .the South Africans seldom say.
That is, the cost of living for Africans is much higher in South Africa
so that the dollar amount is not really-
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Meaningful ?
Mr. WOLFE. Not really as meaningful as it would be if other con-
ditions were equal.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. What is their average~
Mr. WOLFE. In 'South Africa they have very little land on which to
practice subsistence farming so they have to depend much more on
wage and cash crop farming, wages earned and cash crop farming
than do Africans in other African states.
This is where it becomes almost meaningless to make the comparison
of per capita income. I think it is around $200 approximately for
South African Africans where it is generally below $100 for Africans
in other African sta tes.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you.
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Mr. RoSENTHAL. Is it your position that if we took some halfway
steps today, such as economic sanctions or through the elimination of
all American investments, wemightp~event getting into: a more severe
holocaust some years ahead, if and when black Africa decides they can
no longer permit this redoubt to continue ~
Mr. WOLFE. This is a very reasonable question and one which the
ADA, for whom I am speaking, has made a statement just recently
recommending particular actions .that could be taken immediately.
They include such actions as this.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. I know the action they recommend. Is it your
position that we can take an easier step today than a much tougher
step 3, 4, 5 years from today ~ In other words, answering .that, IS it
your opinion that violence there is inevitable, violence involving the
entire continent ~
Mr. WOLFE. No; I don't think that revolutionary violence is inevi-
table even in South Africa. I think it is a place where it is very likely.
If there is not revolutionary violence, then there will be the permanent
establishment of an exploitative state system in which we are involved
because of our investments.
This I think would be for most of us a very serious situation.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. We can express moral outrage .by withdrawing
American investments. That is not going to be the next step ,to eco-
nomic sanctions.
Mr. WOLFE. That is right. It would satisfy ~me of our moral im-
pulses but I do not think ilt, ,,!ould really reso!ve the!prob~em. .
Mr. ROSENTHAL. My questIon was, Is It not m the .A:merlcan natIonal
interest to get into the situation sooner rather than later if the price
is very cheap now but may be very dear some years ahead~ I do notknow if that is the case. ' I amtrying!t() explore it.
Mr. WOLFE. I think the only way to do this is by complet~ economic
sanctions' against South Africa. I do not agree that any half-way
steps such as just withdrawing our owninvestmentwoU:ld briIlgdown
,the Government of South Africa or c~ai1ge the political coroplexion
of it.
MI'. ROSENTHAL: It would satisfy our moral outrage ~
Mr.WoiJFE. Itwouldsa~is.fy.muchofit;yes,sir. ..
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Why IS It m the AmerIcan natIonal Itlterest ,to do
any more than that~
Mr. WOLFE. Ithink it is in the American national interest to do more
than ~hat because !n the long run to maintain a sy~tem such as they
have m South AfrIca would mvolve also the spreadIng of such an ex-
ploitative system and it could even affect us back here at home;
Let me give a kind of example which may not seem realistic, there
are many companies which have investments both in South Africa and
in the United States. In South Africa they can mine successfully
and pay miners something like $200 a year. Here, because we have
minimum wage laws and because we permit unionization and so forth,
collective bargaining, they have to pay miners much more. If they
can continue to use that South African plant which seems so efficient
in dollar terms, it seems to me that there would be a tendency for them
to make it .harder on American workers.
Mr. ROSENTHAL. This is kind of a remote possibility I think.
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Mr. GANS, Can I adda couple of things?
Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes.
Mr. GANS. Most of the world is ooncerned about the condi.tions that
the Africans are forced to live in. I think it is in the American in-
terest to some extent to be for the types of things that we are ,theoret-
ically for in our Constitution and in our Declaration of Independence ;
namely, the equality of all poople. If we are one of the detractors
from colleotive action, then we mar our own image in the world and
create difficulties.
Secondly, the types of oonditions that exist in South Africa are the
types of conditions that those very hostile to democracy often use to
foment disturbances. In a revolutionary situation that might develop
in the forthcoming years from this type of exploitation, which of
necessity will foster a type of discontent and may also unite African
nations to take some sort of collective action against South Africa, per-
haps militarily, we will be in a very embarrassing position if the pri-
mary supporters of that type of action are people from other parts of
the world such as the Soviet Union or China.
Mr. RosENTHAL. You mean if a revolutionary situation developed in
South Africa, aided and abetted by other black African states, then
they received assistance or encouragement from either Russia or
China, we might then find the situation much more difficult to resolve ?
Mr. GANS. Exactly.
Mr. RosENTHAL.,Mr. Roybal?
Mr. RoYBAL. I am in agreement w)th what you are trying to do with
regard to complete economic sanctions. You are trying to look for a
legal reason to take these steps. I think historians are going to be
cr.tical, to say the least, of our legal position for our presence in Viet-
nam and for our intervention in the Dominican Republic.
This in my opinion could result in the same kind of situation. If
we take one step we will take the other and finally probably get into
a situation where we will intervene not only in the economic affairs
of that nation but intervene militarily.
I would like to go on to another question, another field, if the chair-
man will permit me. That is, that you stated that the Government
de-crees that only workers whose earnings exceed $754 per year are
eligible for mlemployment insurance benefits.
You have also stated that the average wage for miners is $213 a
year and that those who are working in the manufacturing industry
get $5~QJ>er year.
Mr. WOLFE. Yes, sir.
Mr. RoYBAL. Does this mean that all these people working in both
of these industries are not protected in any way by unemployment
insurance benefits ?
Mr. WOLFE. Not all of them, but obviously the majority. The fig-
ures are all average figures. So if the wage which permIts people to
come under unemf loyment compensation laws is higher than the mean
wage, then most o the people would be-
Mr. RoyBAL. I thought you made reference to the fact that in these
two industries there was this type of discrimination. It is actually
based on the earning power of the individual and not the industry
to which h~ belongs ?
Mr. WOLFE. Yes, sir, that is rig'ht.

